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TO BE ETHICAL, PROFESSIONALLY RESPONSIBLE, LAWYERS
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EXTRACT
Throughout our lives, below the level of our consciousness, each of us develops powerful
values, intuitions, expectations, and needs that powerfully affect both our perceptions and our
judgments. Placed in situations in which we feel threatened, or which implicate our values, our
brains, relying on those implicitly learned, emotionally weighted, memories, can "downshift," to
primitive, self-protective problem solving techniques - fight or flight. Because these processes
operate below the radar of our consciousness, we react without reflection or the opportunity for
interdiction. Thus, it may be that automatic, “emotional” reaction, rather than thoughtful,
reasoned analysis leads to our responses to stressful, questions of ethics and professional
responsibility. Lawyers continually face complex, problems of great moment to their clients and
the community, problems which implicate their own professional values. They need to learn to
address these problems thoughtfully and effectively while carrying out their professional
responsibilities as representatives of their clients, officers of the judicial system, and public
citizens, exercising both their analytical skills, and moral judgment. To do so, they need to
understand the emotional processes and the content of their intuitions, and have confidence in
their ability to act appropriately. Unfortunately, traditional legal education focuses on teaching
students "legal analysis" of a given set of facts, in which the answer is the formation of a legal
rule, the role of the lawyer is to achieve the client's stated goal, and neither the lawyer's, nor any
third party's, values are relevant. This paper analyzes recent discoveries in cognitive science that
explain the brain's learning and problem solving mechanisms, and applies that scientific
knowledge to demonstrate why traditional legal education may actually impair the ability to
effectively solve complex problems, particularly those freighted with issues of personal values
and professional responsibility. It then describes an alternative pedagogy, problem-based
learning, that provides valuable insights to teaching law students to become ethical practitioners.
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I. WHAT ARE LAW STUDENTS TAUGHTABOUT RESPONDING TO
ETHICAL PROBLEMS?
A. EXAMPLES FROM ALAWYERING: THE REAL WORLD@
Case #1
A bright, honest and hard working fourth year associate, in whom all of the partners saw the
potential for partnership, was investigating a discrimination charge brought by a former
employee of the firm=s client. She decided that a fellow employee might have some important
information. After getting the client=s approval to interview him, she telephoned him to arrange a
meeting to discuss the case. The employee asked her whether the call was about some problem
with his work. She told him Ano,@ that everything was fine with him, but that as counsel to the
company, she needed to talk to him about a matter relating to another person she was
investigating, whom she then identified. The employee also said that since he still saw the former
employee from time to time, he did not want the former employee to know he said anything
negative about him. The associate assured the employee that their conversation would be
confidential. The employee then agreed to meet the next day at the law firm=s office.
In fact, the associate did not know whether the work of the employee to whom she was talking
was fine, nor had she been authorized by the client to tell the employee that. Moreover, while she
was not a Ablabber mouth,@ she had every intention, in accordance with Rule 1.4 of the Rules of
Professional Conduct,2 to report to her client what she learned from the interview.

Case #2
Associate to Partner: AI=ve met with the client in the XYZ matter, gone over the interrogatories
and document requests we got from the other side, reviewed our client=s draft answers, and the
documents they have found that respond to the requests. I think I have a pretty good idea of what
we can answer and what we can object to as being unduly burdensome or not likely to lead to
relevant evidence. Do you want me to draft a set of responses for you to review before they go
out to the client, or to draft a memo to you explaining what I=ve found, and how I think we
should respond?@
Partner to Associate: AAs I recall, these are their first discovery requests to us, so why don=t you
object to all of their interrogatories and document requests? I am sure that you can find some
basis to do so. When they come back to us to negotiate, which they have to do before they can
file any motion to compel, we=ll be in a better position to see what they really want and to
negotiate from there.@
The associate left the partner=s office, presumably to do as he had been instructed.
2
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In Case #1, the well meaning associate may have violated Rules 4.1(a)3 and 4.34 of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct. First, she told the employee that he had done nothing wrong,
implying that she knew that to be a fact, when she did not.5 Then, she represented to the
employee that what he told her would be Aconfidential@ in a situation in which he reasonably
would have thought that she would tell no one else, although the Aconfidentiality@ of which the
lawyer was speaking does not prohibit her from telling her client, the employer.6 Indeed, she
may be bound to disclose what she learns to the employer even if it implicates this employee in
wrongdoing.7 At the same time, she may have violated Rule 1.6,8 when she disclosed to the
prospective interviewee that there was nothing wrong with his performance, a fact that she could
have learned only from the client, and made the disclosure without the client=s permission.
In Case #2, the partner may well be counseling the associate to violate Rule 3.19 by asserting an
issue - objections to the discovery requests - without a Abasis for doing so that is not frivolous.@
This would be particularly likely where the partner has not reviewed the discovery requests, and
thus had no basis to assume that all of them were legitimately subject to objection. If the case is
pending in the federal court or in the court of a state having a rule similar to Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,10 the partner may also be counseling the associate to violate
that rule.
To me the examples11 demonstrate two problems of professional responsibility: (1) an attorney
who, in the daily pressure to zealously represent the client, simply does not bring to
consciousness a significant question of professional responsibility; (2) an associate who is told
by a more senior lawyer to do something that might well raise a significant question of
professional responsibility, and fails to question the instruction, because he doesn=t recognize the
problem, assumes there might be a problem but that the senior lawyer, being older, wiser and
more experienced, knows better, or considers the ethical problem, but, fears demonstrating
disloyalty to the client and/or the senior lawyer.
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Case #3
Attorney was representing a parent in a custody dispute involving their 10 year old child. The
parents had been separated since the child was six years old. The opposing party had Aprimary@
custody and the client had Apartial@ custody (or Avisitation@). Client had begun the custody
proceeding desiring to obtain primary custody, believing that he/she could be a better parent. The
child, however, was thriving in the current living arrangement, physically healthy, doing well in
school both academically and socially, demonstrating appropriate behaviors at home, with the
client during weekends and extended times there, at school, and with friends in the
neighborhood. In addition, the child had recently begun singing in the church=s children=s choir
and seemed to enjoy that activity very much.
Shortly before the date of the hearing, the client arrived at the lawyer=s office to prepare. The
client informed the lawyer that he/she had some new information that should help considerably.
The client had recently learned that the custodial parent had been living with a partner of the
same sex in a homosexual relationship. The lawyer responded by asking how client believed that
relationship might affect the child. The client responded that homosexuality was immoral, and
that living in a household of such blatant immorality would permanently damage the child, and
perhaps lead the child to adopt homosexuality as a way of life. The lawyer sought, but got
nothing more from the client in the way of evidence of harm to the child.
Under the law of the state in which the matter was pending, a parent=s sexual orientation is
entirely irrelevant to custody unless there is evidence that it is causing some harm to the child.
The client=s fear that the child was in a sinful environment based upon the homosexual
relationship of the other parent is a matter of religious difference between the parents and, absent
some palpable harm to the child, that too, was irrelevant.
At the same time, the lawyer knew that the judge before whom the matter was to be heard had a
reputation as a homophobe. The lawyer believed that if the situation was brought to the judge=s
attention, he would likely decide the matter in his client=s favor, and that if there was an appeal,
the judge would write an opinion explaining the decision on grounds totally unrelated to the
evidence of the other parent=s homosexuality.
Should the lawyer, in an opening statement, in questioning the opposing party, or in some other
way, bring out the issue of the other parent=s living situation in order to influence the judge? I
have asked that question on many occasions to law students and lawyers. Almost to a person, the
unhesitating response is that the lawyer, in the zealous representation of his client, should find a
way to reveal the living arrangements even without any evidence of adverse affect on the child.
If opposing counsel fails to object, or if he does object and the objection is overruled, that is not
the questioner=s concern in our system. As to what the judge decides, and how he explains his
decision in an opinion, that is up to the judge, not the lawyer.
ABut what about Rule 3.1?@12 The answer, invariably, is that as an advocate for my client in our
adversary system, I don=t have to make objections to my own questions, that is for my opponent;
12
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nor do I make the rulings on evidence, that is for the judge, and Rule 3.1 doesn=t require anything
else. Occasionally a lawyer or law student seeks to Afight the hypo@ by arguing that if my client
thinks that living in the other parent=s household is harmful to the child, perhaps it is, in some
way we don=t yet understand. Thus, the question is not improper. Rather than even concede that
there is an ethical question, the law students and lawyers present arguments (the zealous
advocate in the adversarial system) for their client=s desired position.
The associates in both cases #1 and #2 graduated from excellent law schools, and had been on
their respective school=s Law Review. Presumably both had passed the school=s course on legal
ethics, as well as the MPRE. The lawyer in case #3, a pre-1974 law school graduate, was
experienced and well respected among his peers. If you asked the first associate directly whether
it is permissible to lie to a witness about some fact relevant to the witness, whether she was free
to disclose information about the employee=s employment with a client without the client=s
permission, or whether she was free not to tell the witness that her interest as counsel for the
client and his interest might be adverse, I have no doubt that she would have quickly answered,
ANo@ to all three questions. If you asked the associate in Case #2 whether he had an obligation to
respond to discovery requests in good faith, rather than simply delay and force the requesting
party to negotiate without any good faith objection to particular interrogatories or document
requests, I suspect that he would have answered in the affirmative. Indeed, I am quite certain,
knowing the partner in case #2, as I do, that if the partner was asked a similar question in a
general form, not related to a specific matter in which he was involved, he, too, would have
immediately answered Ayes.@ If you had asked lawyer # 3 if it is permissible to proffer evidence
one knows to be inadmissible, I believe that he would have answered in the negative. So, why
had each of these lawyers acted as they did?
Case # 413:
There is a scene at the beginning of the movie, APHILADELPHIA@14 in which Tom Hanks
comes into Denzel Washington=s law office seeking representation to sue his former law firm for
wrongful termination. Hanks is a young lawyer who has recently been fired because, he believes,
the firm=s management discovered that he had AIDS. Washington, an apparently successful,
contingent fee, plaintiffs= lawyer, declines the representation because of Hanks= illness. What
gives the scene particular bite is that Hanks was preceded into Washington=s office by a man who
wanted representation to sue the city for negligence. It seems that there was a hole in the middle
of the street where the city was having some construction done, the location was in mid-block,
rather than in a pedestrian crosswalk, and the construction site was clearly marked off by yellow
warning tape. Nevertheless, the prospective plaintiff managed to find and fall into the hole. Even
Washington seems surprised, after asking in vain for evidence of mitigating circumstances, to
find that the man still wants to sue. Despite these extraordinary facts, Washington readily agrees
to represent the injured man, and even refers him for examination by a doctor that Washington
apparently uses in such cases.
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B. LEARNING DOES NOT NECESSARILY LEAD TO DOING.
Learning the Rules of Professional Conduct does not necessarily lead to ethical practice.
“Moral life is not to be confused with test meant to measure certain
kinds of abstract (moral) thinking, or with test that give people a
chance to offer hypothetical responses to made-up scenarios. We
never quite know what will happen in this life; nor do we know
how an event will connect with ourselves”15
The associate in Case #1 was assigned to obtain information for her client=s defense of a claim
against it. Her conduct was both logical and truthful, and her purpose innocuous. While
truthfulness and benign purpose are relevant, they are not sufficient to satisfy the Rules of
Professional Responsibility. She had probably studied Rules 1.6, 4.1, 4.3, and 4.4 in her
Professional Responsibility course and in preparation for the MPRE.16 However, in all likelihood
her study of those rules was explicit B the class knew in advance that the treatment of those rules
was to be covered in the readings and class. And more likely than not, the cases and hypos would
have focused on sharing information that might be harmful or embarrassing to the client, sharing
information which the client does not want shared (Rule 1.6),17 or speaking or withholding
information in order to take advantage of the third party. (Rules 4.1, 4.3, and 4.4)18 Here, that
was not the case. Hence, whatever memory she retained about the application of the Rules of
Professional Conduct from those classes would not necessarily connect with the cues from her
experience in Areal life.@
The associate in Case #2 may have had a similar non-recognition experience to that of the
associate in Case #1. However, let us assume that he actually did consider whether the
instruction from the partner was ethically appropriate. At that point, he would have faced a
dilemma. Should he, a young and aspiring associate, question a more senior lawyer, especially
where that lawyer=s directive seems more likely to serve the client=s goal of the successful
outcome of the litigation B a goal which the associate is bound to pursue, under Rule 1.2(a) of the
Rules of Professional Conduct?19 The associate has been taught both in law school, and since
entering practice, that he is bound to pursue the client=s lawful goals. Should he deviate from that
precept in a matter which would require him to question the partner=s ethics? Answering that
question could lead to sweaty palms, or worse.
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What does the associate=s brain do when faced with this problem? The associate needs, in Case
#1, to secure the witness= information in order to be successful in representing her client, and
thus satisfying her boss. In Case #2 the associate needs to avoid conflict with his boss. As I will
argue below, our motivation significantly affects our analysis of problems with which we are
faced, even when those goals appear to conflict with the clear meaning of the data.20 Thus, in
both cases, the associates= needs powerfully affected their judgment as to what behavior was
appropriate, despite what they might know about the constraints of the Rules of Professional
Conduct. When the conflict between our goals and other values is serious enough to produce
severe stress, our brains might well Adownshift@ into survival mode -fight or flight. 21 In Case #2,
fight is not readily available, since there is no one with whom to fight except the partner, and that
doesn=t seem likely to make things better. If he challenges the partner=s ethics, even if he is right,
and almost certainly if he is wrong, his job, his income, his future as a lawyer may be in
jeopardy? Flight, for the associate in this case, means denial that this is his problem. That is,
acceding to the assumed wisdom of the partner. Alternatively, the associate might think that he
might be right even if he is only a second year associate. In that case the Aflight@ response is to
return to the Atried and true,@ that is, to some problem solving mechanism that he has used
successfully in Athe law@ before.22
Inevitably, we look for solutions to problems we face by first scanning our memories for similar
situations, and applying the principles and methods that we used in those situations. In the case
of lawyers, particularly newer lawyers, our memories for solving legal problems were created in
law school.23
I suggest that the fundamental problem solving principles that our students are taught in law
school are:
1. The answer lies in the formulation of a legal rule;
2. My role as a lawyer, i.e., a Azealous advocate,@ is to help my client achieve his
goal, regardless of what the law seems to be. Lawyers help their clients
achieve their goals principally by building arguments that will lead to the
application of the desired rule of law to the client=s situation.
3. Neither my personal values, nor the interests of third parties are to be
considered in the pursuit of my client=s goals.24
20

See, ZIVA KUNDA, SOCIAL COGNITION, MAKING SENSE OF PEOPLE 211 (Mass. Inst. of Tech., 1999) (noting that
A[M]otivation and affect influence judgment by influencing the cognitive processes we engage in to arrive at a
judgment. Both motivation and affect may influence which concepts, beliefs, and rules we apply to a judgment; we
may be especially likely to apply those that are congruent with our goals and moods. Motivation and affect may also
influence our mode of processing information, determining whether we rely on quick and easy inferential shortcuts
or rely on elaborate systematic reasoning.@)
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See discussion infra, p.23.
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See discussion infra, p. 23.
23
See id..
24
See discussion infra, pp. 15-16.
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Applying those principles, the associate in case #2 might examine Rule 3.1, the apparently
governing legal rule:
AA lawyer shall not. . . .defend a proceeding, or. . . controvert an issue therein, unless there is a
basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an
extension, modification or reversal of existing law@25
Perhaps he would argue that Rule 3.1 does not apply because non responsiveness to discovery
requests is not Adefend[ing] a proceeding or controvert[ing] an issue therein....@ thereby obviating
the fear of violation of the Rules. He can then go back to the individual discovery requests and
re-examine them to see if he can so interpret them as to find a basis for asserting that Athe
information sought [does not] appear reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence@ under Rule 26 (b)(1)26 or come up with some other acceptable objection. Since,
whether this process satisfied his personal values or unduly burdened the opposing party or its
counsel is irrelevant under the Athree principles,@ his post-hoc rationale, carried out in accordance
with his law school learning about how to be a lawyer, would provide him with a basis, morally
justifiable to himself, for following the partner=s direction.
Similarly, in Case #3, the lawyer may well resort to the above principles by first making an
argument that the introduction of the inadmissible evidence does not raise an ethical issue based
upon the argument that the admissibility of the evidence in question is not a Aproceeding@ or an
Aissue@ in a proceeding, because the latter refers to a substantive issue. Alternatively, it is simply
not part of his Arole@ as a zealous advocate for his client to avoid proffering evidence merely
because the other party might object and the judge might sustain the objection. The attorney
might also argue that he is, in good faith, arguing for Aan extension, modification or reversal@ of
the otherwise applicable rule as to the admissibility of such evidence, or at least that he needs to
preserve his ability to do so on appeal by raising the matter at the trial level.27
What=s Wrong With this Picture? And Why?
In each of the examples, the lawyer was faced with a situation which posed a complex problem
with significant risks - problems that threatened to lead them away from Azealously,@ and perhaps
successfully, pursuing their clients= expressed goals. In case #1 the problem was how to get
important information from an individual who was fearful that disclosure that might harm her. In
case #2, the problem was responding to discovery without giving away information
unnecessarily, and when a more senior lawyer has told you to respond in a manner that you think
might be unethical. In case #3, the problem is how to win the case, and appear to be zealously
representing your client, while not using evidence that, to the client is clearly both critically
relevant and highly persuasive, but to the experienced lawyer is clearly inadmissible. Lawyers
25

MODEL RULES R. 3.1.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (claiming that ARelevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the
discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.@).
27
See FED. R. EVID. 103(a) (2) (explaing the concept of offer of proof B AIn case the ruling is one excluding
evidence, the substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was apparent from the context
within which questions were asked. Once the court makes a definite ruling on the record admitting or excluding
evidence, wither at or before trial, a party need not renew an objection or offer of proof to preserve a claim of error
for appeal.@).
26
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face such situations frequently. Indeed, it can be said that the most important work that lawyers
do, is to solve complex problems whether of ethics, or otherwise. 28 While law schoolsmake
some effort to teach students analytical tools for addressing those situations, the curriculum and
pedagogy of most law schools effectively teaches them
how to solve only a very narrow range of
problems, using a very narrow range of their problem solving tools.29
Observing Denzel Washington=s choice not to represent Tom Hanks in PHILADELPHIA, one
might argue (as many of my students have) that a lawyer in private practice is free to decline to
represent anyone that he/she chooses. Yet, we also know that our legal system assumes that
competent representation is essential for anyone who seeks redress in our courts. The Supreme
Court has held that representation is mandatory in serious criminal cases30 though not in civil
cases.31 However, the Model Rules encourage lawyers to engage in Apro bono publico service@,
and cases such as Hanks= fit precisely within the classes of cases identified in the rule.32 The fact
that Hanks had been turned down by ten other lawyers, and that Washington was his last hope
did not move Washington, even to make the superficial inquiry about the potential legal merits of
the claim, as he had with the previous client with a facially questionable claim.
The four examples thus demonstrate, as Robert Coles argued,33 that knowledge of the rules and
legal analysis that we teach do not necessarily lead to ethical, professionally responsible, action.
And while law schools regularly give public kudos, to lawyers who perform work in the public
interest, in their classes, they provide no exposure to difficult questions concerning how students
personal values should influence their professional choices of clients, or their professional
behavior, what, if any, pro bono work to do, how to balance pro bono work with fee generating
work, or how to deal with superiors in one=s law firm whose focus may be on billable hours and
litigation outcomes, rather than on the aspirations of Rule 6.1, or some concept of ethical and
professional practice. Consequently, students emerge from law school either not steeped in the
values of public service and the responsibility of lawyers to assure that individuals have access to
legal services, or they lack the tools to navigate both the economic demands of the private
28

Gary L. Blasi, What Lawyers Know: Lawyering Expertise, Cognitive Science, and the Functions of Theory, 45 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 313, 315 (1995) (promoting the use of cognitive science to help understand how lawyers make
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skill not emphasized in most law schools); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS
STUDY, 101 (1951) (arguing that lawyers, through Ahuman ingenuity,@ keep the law and the legal system, as well as
the legal tools available to commercial enterprises, on pace with our constantly evolving society); Alan M. Lerner,
Law & Lawyering in the Workplace: Building Better Lawyers by Teaching Students to Exercise Critical Judgment
as Creative Problem Solvers, 32 AKRON L. REV. 107, 109-112 (1999) (emphasizing the importance of lawyers
exercising critical judgment in solving problems); Paul Brest, The Responsibility of Law Schools: Educating
Lawyers as Counselors and Problems Solvers, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 5, 6 (1995) (criticizing law schools=
failure to adequately prepare students in skills beyond doctrine and legal analysis and proposing as an alternative
courses which integrate Ainsights@ from disciplines such as economics, psychology, and business); Thomas D.
Barton, Conceiving the Lawyer as Creative Problem Solver: Introduction, 34 CAL. W. L. REV. 267, 267-270 (1998)
(stressing the importance of creative problem solving in law).
29
Blasi, supra note 28, at 319, 359-360, 386-387; See also, Steven I. Friedland, How We Teach: A Survey of
Teaching Techniques in American Law Schools, 20 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 12 (1996).
30
See, Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
31
See, Lassiter v. Department of Social Services of Durham County, North Carolina, 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
32
MODEL RULES R. 6.1(a) (1) and (b) (1) and (2) (ABA)( quote).
33
ROBERT COLES, SUPRA, NOTE 15, AT 29
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practice of law, and the urgings of Rule 6.1, as they reflect genuine need within our
communities. And, when confronted with ethical problems, they make arguments to justify doing
what will most likely lead to the result sought by the client, or the senior partner, regardless of
the spirit of the rules, their own values, or the public interest.
Thus, the legal academy should be asking, whether the prevailing curriculum and
fails to
support, or may actually impede students= development as effective, professionally responsible,
moral lawyers, and whether we can do better.34
One reason for our persistence on this path is, I believe, that we have not incorporated into our
teaching scientific discoveries over the past two or three decades about how people learn, what
inhibits and enhances the effective use of what we teach, and the effective use of learning to
address emerging problems, particularly when those problems are professionally threatening to
them.
The legal literature contains a number of examples of experiments with teaching professional
responsibility using experiential methods.35 There are also articles which seek to explain why
experiential pedagogy can be expected to produce more effective learning in this area than other
methods.36 Conversely, I have, too often, heard from fellow law teachers that, starting with
students who have spent the first 22 or more, formative years of their lives developing their
character - for better or for worse - our three years of law school cannot possibly be expected to
34

In 1998, Professor Susan Sturm and I developed a first year elective course designed to teach problem solving to
law students in the second semester of the first year, by creating a series of simulations in which they would be
placed in role and asked to create a solution to the problem. Lerner, supra note 28, at 109-110 nn.2-3. In the first
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should do. Although the problem did not say that litigation had been started, or even was contemplated, by any
party, every student assumed that they were already in litigation in court, and addressed only the potential litigation
strategies in their letters to their clients. Id. at 123-124.
35
See e.g., Douglas N. Frenkel, On Trying to Teach Judgment, 12 LEGAL EDUC. REV. 19 (2001) (sharing the
author=s experience teaching professional responsibility to upper-year students through the use of real world
dilemmas that evoke student responses on both an intellectual and emotional level, student participation, and
occasional role plays); Eleanor W. Myers, Teaching Good and Teaching Well: Integrating Values with Theory and
Practice, 47 J. LEGAL ED. 401 (1997) (relating the author=s experience teaching the two semester AIntegrated
Transactional Practice@ course which includes trusts and estates, professional responsibility, interviewing,
negotiating, counseling, and drafting); Steven Hartwell, Promoting Moral Development Through Experiential
Teaching, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 505, 522-528, 532-535 (1995) (discussing the author=s experience of how teaching a
professional responsibility course centered on student group interaction and collaboration to solve problems rather
than teacher led discussions improved the students= moral reasoning); David Luban & Michael Millemann, Good
Judgment: Ethics Teaching in Dark Times, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 31 (1995) (discussing the authors= incorporation
of a legal ethics course with a clinical one in which students met weekly specifically to discuss ethical issues arising
in their clinical work); Barton, supra note 2); SYMPOSIUM, TEACHING ETHICS, 58 Law & Contemp. Prob., (Summer/
Autumn 1995)(Collecting more than 20 articles discussing experiments in teaching legal ethics at various law
school which received grants fro that purpose from the Keck Foundation),
36
See e.g., Blasi, supra note 28, at 315, 320; Anthony G. Amsterdam, Clinical Legal Education - A 21st Century
Perspective, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 612 (1984) (hypothesizing that in the future, law schools will have realized that
concentrating solely on teaching students doctrinal analysis and case interpretation is too narrow and ill-prepares
them; rather, schools should focus on teaching students how to learn law from the exercise of practicing); Stephen
McG. Bundy, Teaching Legal Ethics: Improving the Required Ethics Course, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 19
(1995) (discussing Boalt Hall=s experiment with teaching the required professional responsibility course in the first
year and the school=s ultimate decision to return it to the upper-year curriculum).
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have any impact on the ethics and professional responsibility of the graduates that we send out
into the profession and the world.37 Yet there is also evidence that professional school may be an
ideal place to teach ethical decision making.38
With that in mind, I propose to (a) examine recent discoveries in cognitive science about how
humans learn and what affects their ability to apply what they have learned to new situations, (b)
assess how that data relates to how we educate our students, and (c) identify approaches to
teaching that I submit will enable us to help our students become more ethical, professionally
responsible lawyers. Part II of this paper will discuss applicable scientific principles of learning
and problem solving. Part III will compare those principles with the strategy, process, and effect
of traditional Langdellian / Socratic teaching. In Part IV, I will attempt to demonstrate why
experiential, highly contextualized, behaviorally oriented, problem based teaching is likely to be
more effective than traditional pedagogy in producing lawyers who are ethical, and
professionally responsible.
II. THE HUMAN BRAIN IS A PROBLEM SOLVING MACHING.
To use a modern business metaphor, learning and solving problems are part of the Acore
business@ of the human brain. One cogent example is that of learning language. Virtually every
child is born with the capacity to learn language. Without taking a single lesson, they learn to
understand and communicate in the language, or languages, that are most prevalent in their
environment. Where spoken language is the norm, they learn by hearing, then orally
communicating. Where signing is the norm, they learn to understand and then to communicate
in sign.39 Only thereafter do they learn to communicate through reading and writing. Clearly
Athe brain@ comes equipped to solve the problem of communication, and it accomplishes that
goal by learning from its environment.

37

See Luban & Millemann=s discussion of AThe Problem of Excessive Engagement,@ supra note 35, at 83-86
(exploring how students often reexamined their positions and changed their viewpoints after participating in clinical
work, but if their exposure was limited to classroom learning only, their views were unchanged); Susan P. Koniak &
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Paying Attention to the Signs, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 118, 120 (1995) (promoting
the importance of pervasively teaching legal ethics and noting that the failure to do so risks sending the message that
there is no problem with behaving unethically); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Symposium, The Legal Profession: The
Impact of Law and Legal Theory, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 239, 240 (1998) (discussing the failure of law schools to
teach ethics).
38
See, James R. Rest, Can Ethics Be Taught In Professional School? The Psychological Research, in EASIER SAID
THAN DONE 22 (1998).
39
For a more detailed discussion see MARC MARSCHARK, PSYCHOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT OF DEAF CHILDREN 98,
107 (1993) reviewing the literature reporting research as to language acquisition among deaf children, and
concluding that A[s]ign language clearly can serve as an effective mode of communication for young deaf children
and reveals typical stages of normal acquisition under certain circumstances.@ Id. at 98. A[I]conic signs and arbitrary
signs are learned with equal facility by children acquiring sign as a first language Y. [and] unlike early gestures, are
not necessarily tied to physical similarities in the world but represent true linguistic symbols at a stage of
development prior to spoken words.@ Id. at 107. Marschark concludes, AThe sequence of emerging semantic
relations in deaf children=s language production parallels that observed in hearing children, at least when manual
deaf children are evaluated using sign language.@ Id. at 126.
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Another example is the use of logic. While there are substantial variances among individuals in
their ability to use logic, the human brain seems to find logic compelling, if not irresistible. As
Steven Pinker has observed,
All languages have logical terms like not, and, same, equivalent,
and opposite. Children use and, not, or, and if appropriately before
they turn three, not only in English but in half a dozen other
languages that have been studied. Logical inferences are ubiquitous
in human thought, particularly when we understand language.40

A. THE BRAIN: A SYMPHONY in THREE MOVEMENTS
The most widely accepted theory of the brain=s evolutionary development of functional
specialization, first proposed by Paul D. Mac Lean, former director of the Laboratory of the
Brain and Behavior at the U.S. National Institutes of Health, is that we have developed, over
time, three discrete, though interconnected, areas of the brain.41 These areas are frequently
referred to as the AR complex@ or Areptilian@ brain, the limbic system, and the neocortex.42
The reptilian brain is the most primitive part of the brain. It is primarily involved with physical
survival and operation of the Asystem@ which is the body. It controls food processing (eating and
eliminating), systems operation (heart, lungs, liver, etc.), reproduction, establishing and
maintaining home territory (territoriality), various Agroup@ behaviors, and execution of the flight
or fight response.43 Overall, R-complex behaviors are Aautomatic, have a ritualistic quality and
are highly resistant to change.@44
The limbic system is primarily involved with the emotional system, with evaluating, organizing
and directing incoming data for processing in the brain stem and the cortex, and with our
awareness of ourselves, physically and emotionally. It is the focus of the creation of memories
developed in the context of active living. Contextual memories are a composite of our inner and
outer worlds - our history of emotional and perceptual experiences, and new information
constantly arriving through our ongoing perceptions and experiences.45

40

STEVEN PINKER, HOW THE MIND WORKS 334 (1997).
Paul D. Mac Lean, A Mind of Three Minds: Educating the Triune Brain, in EDUCATION AND THE BRAIN, 308-342
(Jeanne S. Chall & Allan F. Mirsky, eds., 1978) (discussing the three parts of the brain B the Atriune@ brain B and
how although it has expanded in size, the brain has retained the basic features that reflect human=s descendency from
reptiles, early mammals, and recent mammals).
42
Id., see also RENATE NUMMELA CAINE & GEOFFREY CAINE, MAKING CONNECTIONS: TEACHING AND THE HUMAN
BRAIN, 58 (1994).
43
CAINE & CAINE, supra, note 42, at 59-61.
44
Id. at 59.
45
Id. at 62.
41
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The limbic system is also involved with certain of our primal activities such as sense of smell,
sex, nourishment and bonding between individuals.46 It is capable of mediating our responses to
external data through its ability to Aread@ and act upon our emotional responses, as well as
overriding rational thought. Because the limbic system is involved in all of these activities,
emotion is involved with virtually everything that we experience or do. For example, when
incoming data indicates a problem, and the limbic system in concert with our rational/emotional
brain structures, can discover no appropriate solution or problem solving process, anxiety, even
fear, takes over, and the brain activates our fight-or-flight stress response.47 The limbic system is
powerful. AWe tend to follow our emotions.@48
Finally, the neocortex, the outer portion of the brain, does most of the processing of sensory data,
and makes language, logical and formal thinking, and planning for the future possible. It is
responsible for the creativity that we call science and art,49 and is largely responsible for
planning, analysis, sequencing, learning from errors, certain inhibitions to inappropriate
behaviors and capacity for abstraction, including empathy.50 Logical/rational thinking is
centered in the neocortex.51
All three parts of the brain are in constant interaction. Although one segment may be
predominantly Ain charge@ at a given moment, the others are not entirely out of the picture. This
is especially true of the limbic system because it is engaged in activities which are also part of
the function of the other two. For example, the limbic system=s receipt, and direction of incoming
data, relates to the perception and analysis of external data by the neocortex, and is essential as a
trigger for the response mechanism of the Areptilian@ brain.
The challenge for legaleducators, is to help students learn so that, wh en faced with problems,
whether intellectual, moral or both, they avoid resorting solely to the automatic, primitive, flight
or fight response, but rather engage their neocortex with all of its power to process sensory data,
draw broadly from memory, abstract, identify patterns, analyze rationally, and create new
concepts, thus bringing to consciousness a broad range of potentially effective, ethical responses.
In the following sections I will argue that the keys to the ability to learn so that learning is usable
for effective problem solving and ethical lawyering are (a) the brain=s neural network system for
recording implicit experience in memory and later recalling it, (b) the emotional power of the
limbic system, and (c) their interaction.

46

ROBERT SYLWESTER, A CELEBRATION OF NEURONS: AN EDUCATOR=S GUIDE TO THE HUMAN BRAIN, 43-44
(1995).
47
Id. at 45.
48
Id. at 44. See also, Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to
Moral Judgment, 108 Psychological Review 814 (2001) (arguing that moral judgment Ais generally the result of
quick, automatic evaluations@); Joshua D. Greene, et al., An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral
Judgment, 293 SCI. 2105 (2001) (arguing that based on their experiments, the degree to which emotion is engaged in
influencing moral judgment varies with the kind of moral dilemma presented) See discussion infra pp. 15-16;
THOMAS LEWIS, ET AL., A GENERAL THEORY OF LOVE, 112-118 (2001); See also discussion infra pp. 15-17of LEE
ROSS & RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION: PERSPECTIVES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (1991).
49
CAINE & CAINE, supra note 42, at 63.
50
Id. at 67.
51
Id.
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B. CREATING MEMORY: CONNECTIVITY and our NEURAL NETWORK SYSTEM
1. Encoding the Brain - The Process of Transforming Sensory Perception or Feeling into
Memory
In a very real sense, we are our memories because it is from our memories alone that we
have a conception of who we are. We can have that conception only as it relates to the
environment in which we exist.52 How our ongoing experience of the environment is recorded,
stored, and recalled is what memory is all about. The stimulation of our sense organs and our
emotions causes electrical impulses to be transmitted to nerves which connect the sense receptors
to the brain, where they are encoded. Memory is the result of the process by which the electrical
impulses caused by sense and emotional stimulation are recorded in the brain.53 The
physiological key to those processes are the neurons and their interactions with each other
throughout the brain. A[T]he content of brain activity lies in the patterns of connections and
activity among the neurons.@54 Because we are always in some context and the brain is always
receiving sensory signals and recording them, the brain is always learning and changing.55
Our neural networks build on existing patterns.56 When new data comes into memory, it seeks
connections with similar content previously recorded.57 The more we repeat experiences that
create the same or similar patterns of neural connection, the stronger the pattern becomes, and
the more likely we are to trigger its recall later.58
This system of creating memory through the patterns of connections among neurons, and the
tendency of repetition to strengthen the pattern and its likely recall, gives rise to several powerful
tools, including the ability to correct errors in the perceived data, to conceptualize, and to create
meaning from discordant data.
a. Error Correction
When I send an email to my wife at Temple Law School and inadvertently omit the Au@ from the
last segment of her address, the email invariably returns as undeliverable. If the process were run
through my brain, however, it would recognize that I was aiming for A---temple.edu@ - not
Atemple.ed@- and make the connection.59
52

DANIEL L. SCHACTER, SEARCHING FOR MEMORY: THE BRAIN, THE MIND, AND THE PAST, 40-42 (1996).
LEWIS ET AL., supra note 48, at 103; SYLWESTER, supra note 46, at 98-100; CAINE & CAINE, supra note 42, at 3031; PINKER, supra note 40, at 25-26.
54
PINKER, supra note 40, at 25.
55
CAINE & CAINE, supra note 42, at 31.
56
LEWIS ET AL., supra note 48, at 128-29; SCHACTER, supra note 52, at 61.
57
PINKER, supra note 40, at 108-110. (pointing out that we learn from examples where learning consists of
increasing the Aweight@ of the connections between and among the memories of related inputs, what he calls a
Apattern associator.@)
58
LEWIS ET AL., supra note 48, at 132-138. Ziva Kunda, supra, note 20, at 162-164. (AWe often approach people and
events with prior expectencies....Your expectencies may determine the very meaning you ascribe to ... behaviors as
you observe them. Events that are congruent with our expectations may be particularly memorable not only because
we pay greater attention to them, but also because they are more strongly related to our existing beliefs.@ Id. at 164)
59
See id. at 136-138 for a more detailed discussion of how the brain performs this operation.
53
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b. Conceptualization
As the brain records similar patterns over time, the common elements of those patterns are
strengthened, while the uncommon elements become weaker, and less likely to be recalled. The
result is the extraction, or creation, of a pattern that represents the core set of connections, the
prototype or underlying concept common to the various inputs.60
c. Creating Meaning from Apparently Discordant Data
Frequently, there may be two possible interpretations from the same sense data. In such cases the
brain is capable of comparing the input data to context and searching among similar patterns of
neural connections in order to select the best Afit.@ Steven Pinker gives the example of hearing
someone say what sounds like AI am going to sinned a pin.@61 The brain could take those sounds
and seek their meaning from memory exactly as they were heard. However, in the process of
trying to locate a pattern that matched the sound and meaning it would likely find no match.
Rather than merely reporting back Adoes not compute,@ as it might if the words heard were in a
language that the listener knew she didn=t understand, the brain will try to figure out what does
make sense by finding a pattern of neural connections that best satisfies all of the ambiguities at
once. If the listener=s memory has recorded that the speaker is one who speaks with a decided
southern or southwestern accent and what that means her brain will determine whether that
pattern fits both the sound and contextually meaningful interpretation. Even, however, if the
listener does not know the speaker=s dialect, she knows that a single speaker uttered both of the
Ain@ vowel sounds. Her memory tells her that at a given time a single speaker usually attaches the
same vowel sound to the same vowel. Thus it is more likely than not that both of the sounds
represent the same letter. Her brain will then try out the available vowels, a, e, o, and u, and
discover that the only vowel that satisfies the constraints of being similarly sounded and making
sense in the context is Ae.@ Atthat point, the listener =s memory will record that the speaker said,
AI am going to send a pen.@62
In Pinker=s example, the critical work of the brain was finding patterns in the memory that most
closely matched the pattern coming from the sensory perceptions, knowledge of the speaker, and
the meaning created by the context of what was said. That required the brain to remember not
only the specifics, such as how different vowels sound, but also to store myriad facts about the
way the world operates, such as that most people give the same vowel the same sound, native
speaking people from the southeastern and southwestern states frequently speak with a particular
dialect, and that the Ae@ and Ai@ sounds are frequently the same in that dialect. All of this data is
in our memory even though we never consciously studied it, and the process operates far below
our level of conscious awareness.
And it all happened below our consciousness and so quickly that we are not aware of the process.
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Id. at 111, 128-32, 135, 136-38; PINKER, supra note 40, at 108-110.
PINKER, supra note 40, at 105.
62
Id. at 106.
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In solving the problem of discordant data, the brain will, as we have seen, be substantially
influenced by our expectations and needs.63
2. Explicit and Implicit Memory
A. Explicit Me
Certain memories, referred to as Aexplicit,@ or Ataxon,@ memory, result from intentional learning.
Because the material was explicitly studied as a unique focus of creating a memory of itself,
rather than as part of a broader experiential context, its memory involves only a few of one=s
senses and exists with minimal connection to other memories.64 Learning the directions from
point AA@ to point AB@ written out for you by a friend, or learning how to take apart and reassemble your rifle, are done explicitly. Acquiring such memories usually requires repetition,
and may also be assisted by observation of experts and continual feedback. Such memories
include automatic skill sequences. Memorization of the multiplication tables, the steps to turn on
my computer or car, touch typing, taking apart and re-assembling one=s rifle in the dark, and
specific athletic skills are types of taxon memory. Memory acquired by explicit learning moves
easily between memory and conscious activation. Taxon memories are thus valuable in survival
situations because when triggered by the suggestion of danger, the skills and memories laid
down in that system of memory can quickly be called into play, and we can expect the learned
standard response even without conscious prompting.65
B. Implicit Memory
In contrast, memory that develops from our participation in our environment and comes to us
through a wider variety of sensory receptors is referred to as Aimplicit,@ Alocale@ or Amap@
memory.66 It is referred to as Alocale@ or Amap,@ because it embeds into memory not only the
specific data to be Alearned,@ but also the context, or locale, in which we experienced it. It is
Aimplicit@ because it arises out of our participation in our environment, without regard to our
conscious intention to remember it, and relates to ongoing aspects of our lives.67 Since our
engagement with our environment is continuous, it is related to, and builds upon, knowledge that
already exists in memory.68 Locale memory develops from the ongoing effort of the brain to
create patterns and relationships and to create meaning.69 It does not require repetition or
memorization.
The neural network system for creating memory is constantly recording the context in which we
move and experience life. Learning that takes place implicitly is recorded as part of the entire
contextual pattern, and thus has multiple sensory inputs and myriad neural connections. Each
63

See, ZIVA KUNDA, supra, note 20, at 162-164 (demonstrating how our emotional states of
needs/desire/motivation, and expectation affect the memory we create from the data we perceive)
64
CAINE & CAINE, supra note 42, at 42-44; See SCHACTER, supra note 52, at 170 for a demonstration of this with
amnesic patients.
65
SYLWESTER, supra note 46, at 95-96.
66
CAINE & CAINE, supra note 42, at 44-47.
67
Id. at 46; SYLWESTER, supra note 46 at 95-98; SCHACTER, supra note 52, at 42-45.
68
SCHACTER, supra note 52, at 46; CAINE & CAINE, supra note 42, at 44-46.
69
CAINE & CAINE, supra note 42, at 46.
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new pattern of connections contributes to the brain=s memory of the event.70 Therefore, the more
perceptual and emotional inputs that create the neural pattern for a memory, the more
connections are created among the neurons. The more points of connection in a pattern of
memory, the more likely that a particular stimulus will bring it to recall. 71
At the same time, however, implicit memory has its limitations. For example, the automatic error
correction makes it very difficult for us to proof read our own writing, because our brains have,
over time, developed strong patterns for perceiving and understanding the correct spellings, and,
upon seeing a slightly incorrect one are likely to recall what we are actually seeing as the correct
version.72 We bring to every problem a host of intuitions, beliefs and assumptions. These are
concepts that we have built on implicit memory accumulated over the years, and we seldom, if
ever, reconsider them without some strong external impetus. When the patterns of memory we
draw on to create meaning from discordant data are implicit memory we are not conscious of the
analytical work that our brains are doing. Our tendency to establish meanings, to draw
conclusions, i.e., to conceptualize, from implicit memory, and thereafter to make judgments
based on those concepts leads us to act without the application of critical judgment.73
AImplicit memory warps our window on the world.@74 AWhile explicit memory serves itself up
for conscious reflection, implicit memory does not. That is why it escapes our notice.@75 A[We]
acquire wonderfully complicated knowledge that we cannot describe, explain, or recognize.@76
AThe brain never permits naked reality to intrude into consciousness; all inbound sensory
impressions pass through a process that sands the rough edges off an inhospitably complex
universe.@77 AAll experience comes to us through similar layers of invisible and occasionally
dubious deductions. Y Our internal realities are mock-ups of unparalleled persuasive power.@78
ABehind the bright, analytic engine of consciousness is a shadow of silent strength, spinning
dazzlingly complicated life into automatic actions, convictions without intellect, and hunches
whose reasons follow later or not at all.@79 Implicit memory has been shown, for example, to
contribute to gender and racial biases that people are unaware that they possess.80
The environment in which law students are immersed is rich with reading and interpreting
statutes and court decisions, analyzing text, considering the phrasing of an appropriate rule of
law, and arguing for its adoption against professors and colleagues. Students are constantly
70

SCHACTER,

supra note 52, at 58-59.
Id. at 42-46, 71. See also CAINE & CAINE, supra note 42, at 48-49.
72
LEWIS ET AL., supra note 48, at 138-39.
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SCHACTER, supra note 52, at 170-171.
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Id. at 107.
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Id.
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Id. at 118-119.
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Id. at 119.
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Id. at 112. See also, Haidt, supra note 47; ROSS & NISBETT, supra note 48.
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SCHACTER, supra note 52, at 189-90. Geoffrey Hazard=s concern that the failure to teach ethics throughout the law
school curriculum sends the implicit message is not a problem, HAZARD, PAYING ATTENTION TO THE SIGNS, supra,
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World Of Lawyering As Portrayed In The Clinical Teaching Implicit In Law School, 37 UCLA L. REV. 1157 (1990),
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engaged in analyzing the same type of material, deciding what the legal rule should be, and
zealously advocating in favor of its application.81 Socratic dialog in our classes is emotionally

81

In each law school course, students analyze appellate opinions using substantially the same tools and methods.
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charged, as students are challenged to come up with arguments facing their professors,
surrounded by their peers. By implicit learning, i.e., by doing, and being critiqued, rather than by
intentionally studying the process, and by repetition, students working in that atmosphere learn
principles and processes of analysis of statutes, regulations, and court opinions and how to build
an argument in support of the client=s position. Their neural networks form patterns of implicit
memory that are repeatedly reinforced, to follow or distinguish precedent whenever they must
analyze legal problems. Because they work primarily from appellate opinions, they are
Aprogrammed@ to look to predetermined sources, e.g., the findings of the court below, the
appellate court=s identification of the relevant facts, or the professor=s hypothetical, for all of the
relevant facts. In addition, the emotion of both the Socratic dialogue in class and exams have
reinforced those implicit memories. They may forget most of the particular legal doctrines
learned in various substantive courses; however, forever after, whenever their senses perceive a
problem as a legal problem, their brains will call on the patterns of neural connections – the
memories – that were created implicitly in law school, about how to respond. Noticeable absent
from the explicit teaching, except in the course on ethics, is any consideration of values.
When the legal problem is instrumentalist B how to accomplish our client=s goal - the explicit and
implicit knowledge garnered in law school about how to solve legal problems stands our
students, as lawyers, in good stead, because the answer involves making an effective argument
for the applicability of a legal rule to achieve that goal. The difference between the particular raw
material presented by the client in Areal life,@ and the Ahypos@ faced in law school, are not terribly
problematic, because the concepts and analytical skills that were so effectively encoded in
memory en route to the J.D. are readily transferable to most legal domains. Drawing on those
memories will, generally, produce valuable information for solving instrumentalist legal
problems. However, when the problem is not Ahow to do something,@ but rather whether to do it,
when it involves values or relationships among people B which much of a lawyer=s work does B
neither the explicit, nor the implicit knowledge learned in law school is of much help. Among the
factors that the rule based examination of the problem does not consider are the future
relationships between and among the parties, the values of the relevant players, including the
lawyer and the potential impact on third parties. Relationships and values, however, implicate
emotion as much, or more, than cognitive analysis.

3. The importance of Emotion in Creating Memory
We don’t see things as they are. We see things as we are.82
“[E]motionally important contexts can create powerful memories.” 83 The brain registers events
as pleasurable or painful, exciting or soothing.84 Story and context relating to our experience
82

I have repeatedly seen this quite attributed to Anais Nin, and on occasion to the Talmud, but never with any
specific location or text.
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SYLWESTER, supra note 46, at 96; See also Schacter, supra note 52, at 201, 209 (noting the power of memories
concerning personal trauma): Caine & Caine, supra note 42, at 45-47 (discussing how emotions influence map
formation within the brain).
84
Pinker, supra note 40, at 139.
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necessarily involve emotion. While some particular emotional “highs” or “lows” are explicitly
recorded in memory, most emotional learning is implicit.85 All of our experiences involve our
emotions. Thus our emotions are a critical part of the neural patterns that comprise the memory
of any event. Indeed, some researchers have argued that there can be no memory without
emotional content.86
Emotion drives attention,87 and to the extent that attention to the experience is an aid in creating
memory, emotion is a major contributing factor. That which is meaningful to the rememberer
will be more readily remembered than what is not.88
Our state of mind at the time that we experience events affects what we remember.
Expectations89 and motivation 90 are particularly important factors in determining what we store
in memory.
Expectations can arise from many sources, such as prior experiences, information given by
another person, stereotypes, etc. One example is found in a study in which two groups of
individuals were shown a video of a husband and wife interacting together. Some of the
observers were told that the woman was a librarian, and some were told that she was a waitress.
Some of the activities and attributes of the woman were consistent with stereotypes of waitresses
(e.g., drinks beer, affectionate with husband), and some with those of librarians. (E.g., wears
glasses, listens to classical music) When the observers were questioned after viewing the video,
they recalled the attributes consistent with the stereotype of the person that they brought to their
observation, while not recalling the attributes that were more similar to the other.91
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An example of a study that demonstrates the power of motivation in affecting our perceptions
involved second year students at a religious seminary who were told that they had to give a
practice sermon on then topic of “The Good Samaratin.” Immediately before the time scheduled
for their assignment they were required to be across the campus from the location at which they
were to deliver their sermon. Half of the students were told that they had plenty of time to get
across the campus and still be on time, while the other half were told that they were running late,
and needed to hurry in order to get to their assigned location on time. Along the way, each
passed by a person slumped in a doorway, looking disheveled. Overwhelmingly, those that
thought that they had plenty of time, stopped to see if they could help the person, while those
who thought that they were late, did not. Later, when questioned about what they had seen, those
that felt that they had adequate time, described the person as appearing to be in distress; while
those that thought that they were running late, and did not stop, described the person in terms of
appearing to be drunk, or on drugs.92

4.

The Importance of Childhood Value Development in Adult Moral Reasoning.

In AThe Emotional Dog and its Rational Tail,@ Jonathan Haidt argues that just as all of us are
born with the neural tools to learn language, we are also born with the neural Atools@ to develop
moral intuitions and values, and that during our lives we are immersed in the Abeliefs, values,
sanctions, rules, motives and satisfactions@ of our particular community.93 Even without explicit
Alessons@ in morals and customs, we pay close attention to what we perceive them to be in our
families, peer groups, etc., learning them implicitly, because failure to abide by them will have
serious adverse consequences to us. Peer socialization, more than parental Ateaching@ contributes
to the shaping of these moral intuitions.94 He points out that there is strong evidence that the
brain=s Ahard wiring@ for these abilities in the prefrontal cortex, and thus the foundational
Amemory@ of our moral values, occurs during late childhood through adolescence.95
Haidt=s basic analysis is not new. For example, Lawrence Kohlberg,96 and Carol Gilligan97 while
disagreeing about the nature and extent of the development of values and moral reasoning
nevertheless agree that the process begins in childhood with implicit learning from the people
closest to us. And Robert Coles demonstrates conclusively that moral development is certainly
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an active process in children from a very young age.98 Thus, we arrive at adulthood with
implicitly learned, socially constructed Aintuitions@ concerning most aspects of moral values
which form the basis of our adult moral reasoning B the ASocial Intuitionist@ model of moral
reasoning.99

C. RESPONDING RESPONSIBLY AS LAWYERS: USING the TOOLS WE HAVE
STORED IN MEMORY
The myriad patterns of neural connections that make up our memory, and to which we are
constantly adding, thankfully remain dormant until some stimulus or cue calls them to our
consciousness. Our challenge is to make the greatest use of our explicit and implicit memories
and the creative power of our neo-cortex, to solve the difficult problems that challenge us to act
in a ethically and professionally responsible way, while appropriately serving our clients.
1. The Power of Emotion in Problem Solving
a. The Power of Implicit Emotional Memory
In The Person and the Situation,100 Lee Ross and Richard E. Nisbett collected the results of more
than a dozen studies extending over more than 20 years by a wide array of researchers, to
demonstrate that individuals make critical moral and personal decisions based on their emotional
reaction to factors that appear to be inherent in the situation facing them, rather than on the
individual=s previously demonstrated moral and analytical qualities.101 The vast disparity
between actual and expected behavior strongly suggests that factors other than moral values and
analytical ability are driving the individuals= decisions.
Recent work, by researchers at Princeton University and the University of Pittsburgh102 and by
Jonathan Haidt at the University of Virginia,103 support the proposition that emotions may be
even more powerful than reasoning in making such decisions. In addition, Psychiatrists Lewis,
Amini, and Lannon, have drawn a similar conclusion from their own clinical experiences and a
review of much of the research in the area.104 Cognitive psychologists refer to this process as
Ahot cognition,@ that is mental processes that appear to be the result of our cognitive, analytical,
98

Robert Coles, supra, note 15. (Coles, a child psychiatrist, describes his work with, and observations of, children,
in the 1960s and 1970s in the American South , Brazil and South Africa.)
99
Even those who take issue with the power of Haidt=s social intuitionist model of moral decision making in
adulthood, and the ability of learned cognitive behavior to overcome our Asocial intuitions,@ agree that the process of
developing the powerful, deeply imbedded values which form the foundation for our moral reasoning as adults
proceeds through implicit childhood and adolescent learning. See, e.g., D.A. Pizarro and P., The Intelligence of the
Moral Intuitions: A Reply to Haidt, 110 PSYCHOL. REV. 193 (2003). Haidt, however counters by arguing that while
the cognitive processes identified by Pizarro and Bloom can be deployed, they very seldom are;.leaving our social
intuitions to control our moral decision making. Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog Does Learn New Tricks: A
Reply to Pizarro and Bloom, 110 PSYCHOL. REV. 197 (2003).
100
ROSS & NISBETT, supra note 48.
101
Id.
102
Greene, et al., supra note 48.
103
Haidt, supra note 48.
104
See LEWIS ET AL., supra note 48, at 106-120. (demonstrating how patients with implicit memory brain damage
can still learn, but lose incremental acquisition of intuitive knowledge).

22

processes, but are, in fact, driven by our desires and feelings.105 Moreover, there is now a broad
consensus that the impact of past experiences, even those of which we were never conscious, or
once were conscious but not longer are, and, in any event, have no present realization of their
influence, have great power in directing our present judgments, feelings, and behaviors.106 AWe
may automatically infer people=s character from their behavior, automatically experience
affective reactions to a variety of objects, automatically behave in line with traits cued by recent
experiences, and automatically engage in a variety of other mental processes as well.@107
Importantly, we are unaware of the operation of this process.
Researchers at Princeton University and the University of Pittsburgh, performed functional
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) studies on subjects given three different problems to solve:
one with no moral dilemmas and two with the moral dilemma of whether it is morally acceptable
to affect the death of one person in order to save five.108 The latter two were what are known as
the Atrolley dilemma:@ a trolley is proceeding out of control down a track towards five people
who will certainly be killed if the trolley is not stopped or derailed, but to stop or derail the
trolley will necessarily cause the death of one person.109
In the first of the two trolley situations, the subject is asked if he would throw the switch to shift
the trolley to another track which would necessarily lead to the killing of one person who is
standing on that track. In the second situation, referred to as the Afootbridge dilemma,@ there is no
switch; however, there is a very large man standing at the edge of the footbridge, under which
the runaway trolley will pass before striking and killing the five victims. If the subject pushes the
man off the bridge into the path of the oncoming trolley, the man will be killed, but the impact
will derail the trolley, saving the lives of the five persons who would have otherwise been killed.
The subject is asked whether he would push the man.
Overwhelmingly, subjects said that they would throw the switch in the first case, but not push the
man in the second.110 When asked to explain why, they were not able to do so based on any
logical reasoning.111 Rather, it Afelt@ or seemed different. During the experiment, the fMRI
recorded very different brain activity in the two trolley situations. The brain activity during Athe
switch@ was much closer to that when the subject was considering the non-moral problem than it
was to the brain acting on the Afootbridge@ version. The difference was seen as the actor=s
emotional connection with the act of actually pushing another to his death, as compared with the
more impersonal, and thus less emotional, act of causing his death through the use of an
intervening force, the trolley switch.112 Clearly, these responses demonstrate the Aautomatic
processes@ described by Kunda.113
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AIntuitions within culturally supported ethics become sharper and more chronically accessible,
whereas intuitions within unsupported ethics become weaker and less accessible.@114 Haidt does
not deny that moral thinking and reasoning, and reflective judgment, can be taught, nor that once
taught, they have no impact on one=s moral judgments and action. Rather, he points to earlier
demonstrations that Aattempts to directly teach thinking and reasoning in a classroom setting
generally show little transfer to activities outside the classroom, and because moral judgment
involves [more highly emotionally charged] topics than are usually dealt with in courses that
attempt to teach thinking and reasoning, the degree of transfer is likely to be even smaller.@115
Haidt=s argument is supported by subsequent work done by Joshua Greene and Haidt which
concluded, ANeuroimaging studies of moral judgment in normal adults, as well as studies of
individuals exhibiting aberrant behavior, all point to the conclusion, embraced by the social
intuitionist model, that emotion is a significant driving force in moral judgment. Y These results
also suggest that much, although not necessarily all, moral judgment makes use of processes [in
the brain] specifically dedicated to social cognition and, more specifically, the representation of
others= mental states.@116
d. Avoiding the Danger of ADownshifting@
Making choices and exercising judgment produce stress. Making morally charged choices, or
choices in situations where one feels personally threatened, produces a high level of stress. The
more stressed we are the less likely we are to engage our cognitive processes, and the more likely
we are to rely, unthinkingly, on our expectations, desires, and other emotion laden memories.117
Stress produces physical and psychological reactions within our body.118 Among our reactions
to stress is the release of several hormones in the brain, including adrenaline, noradrenalin and
cortisol.119 Increases in adrenaline and noradrenalin in the brain are generally associated with
stress perceived as a challenge which we have the ability to meet, rather than as a threat. It can
strengthen us to handle the challenge.120 Such stress is not particularly harmful to the body.121
However, under conditions of persistent or unreasonably high stress, the body secretes excessive
amounts of cortisol.122 High levels of cortisol inhibit cognitive functioning, and can lead to the
inability to distinguish between important and unimportant elements of an experience, or to
feelings of despair.123 Thus, constant or unreasonably high levels of stress can have very negative
114
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effects on learning.124 They can impede our capacity to perceive patterns and form memories.125
When our brains perceive a situation as threatening and do not feel able to resolve it
satisfactorily, we do what some psychologists have called Adownshifting,@ to focus on the
perceived threat.126 When we Adownshift@ we narrow our focus and limit the incoming stimuli
which we consider in order to engage our more primitive self protective response mechanism.127
In such situations, the brain is also less able to engage in open ended thinking and connect the
perceived experience with the full array of neural connections that might otherwise be available
to us to formulate a response. Rather than engage the neocortical brain with its power to abstract,
analogize, consider broader and more subtle external and internal cues, and develop new
connections and responses necessary for resolving the threatening situation, we get Astuck.@ At
that point, the brain=s problem solving mechanism may shut down, We feel helpless, fatigued,
even a sense of despair, and are unable to distinguish between important and unimportant
elements in the environment, or to access our open-ended reasoning power. Our brain resorts to
recall primarily from its more primitive, survival oriented reptilian and limbic systems.128
Responding through those systems leaves us with limited tools: the Arelentless unreasoning
force@ of implicit emotional memory with which to understand the situation,129 Aautomatic
actions, convictions without intellect, and hunches whose reasons follow later or not at all@130
and fight or flight as our arsenal of responses. We become defensive, even phobic, and tend to
act precipitously. AWhen we downshift, we revert to the tried and true, and follow old beliefs
and behaviors regardless of what information the road signs provide.@131
In the face of a threatening situation, the critical factor in determining whether we Adownshift,@
limiting our intake of data and the range of our responses, or instead open ourselves to expand
our data intake and deploy the powerful analytical tools of the neo-cortex, appears to be Awhether
we see a solution to [the] problem or perceive ourselves as capable of resolving it.@132
But, these automatic responses that result from emotionally weighted, implicitly learned social
intuitions, can be avoided. For one thing, if we have sufficient time to reflect on the situation, our
emotional response to it, and the consequences of various possible courses of action, we can
override the effects of automatic reactions.133 In addition, when our emotions inform us that we
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care about making the right decision, the emotional force of that motivation can overcome the
tendency to act automatically.134
2. How Experts Do It
AExperts@ are people who can understand and solve problems that others B non-experts B cannot.
Thus, it might be valuable in trying to ascertain how to go about learning to solve complex
ethical problems to examine what it is about Aexpertise@ that enables experts, generically, to do
so.
As described by Gary L. Blasi135 and Donald A. Schön,136 experts seem to be able to leapfrog
over several levels of detailed analysis to identify and engage patterns of apparently related
information directly to a given problem, and also to matters that are facially different, yet
analogous, and thus useful for the solution. Their memories include a combination of a deep
body of subject matter data, and Aexperience,@ the accumulated knowledge from actually using
the data in various situations over time (i.e., in context). Accessing these memories permits them
to compare and contrast the characteristics of the presenting problem with those of the many
problems with which they have engaged in the past. Schön=s describes this as engaging in a
Areflective conversation with a unique and uncertain situation.@ 137 This process enables the
experts to construct patterns, or Amental models@ that permit them to move forward towards a
solution. 138
Critical to the experts= approach to a problem are the following: (1) a deep foundation of factual
knowledge in the domain; (2) experience, i.e., working with the data in context; and (3)
understanding of the conceptual framework that relates to the domain. Given these attributes,
experts can see patterns in the data that might not be obvious to others and thus recognize when a
Agiven@ problem actually has critical unidentified attributes B perhaps even a different
foundational problem - that affect achievement of the desired goal.139
How is such expertise developed?
a. Elaborately Encoded, Implicit Memory
Explicit or taxon, memory created by intentional studying of relevant material is one factor. But,
experts= knowledge cannot be reduced to a fund of explicitly learned data. Rather, it is implicitly
learned, contextualized, and organized around core concepts.140 For the professionals whose
134
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work was examined by Schön, all of the problems presented challenges that they had not directly
encountered before. However, they were able to engage with the problem in context, and find
concepts from their experience that contributed to developing a solution. In so doing, they
continually re-examined and reflected on their understanding of the problem, as well as the
appropriateness of their approach to solving it,141 each time elaborately encoding new patterns of
neural connections that reinforced the core relationships among the data. Without a vast store of
elaborately encoded, implicit knowledge, such an approach would not have been possible. The
creation of implicit memory by repeated elaborate encodings from different, yet similar contexts
not only enhances the internal bond of the patterns of neural connections, but also highlights the
core similarities among related neural patterns, thus strengthening the connections among those
representing the concepts central to the memory.142

b. Adaptive Expertise and Metacognition
Some experts simply possess large funds of domain knowledge but are unable to apply it to
matters outside of those areas. Chess masters, for example, have been shown to have a keen
ability to remember the placement of pieces on the board far better than they can remember
similar non-chess related patterns.143 Other experts, such as those studied by Schön, are able to
adapt their knowledge to the demands of new and different external situations. They are said to
have Aadaptive expertise.@144
Experts with adaptive expertise see the presenting problem as the starting point for exploration,
an exploration that may lead to a reconfiguration of the problem, itself, as well as the
development of a path leading to an effective solution.145 Key to the difference between experts
with and without adaptive expertise is metacognition. Metacognition refers to the ability to
understand one=s own thought processes,146 including the nature, scope and limitations on one=s
knowledge,, and the willingness to seek to overcome the limitations by seeking out new sources
of relevant expertise.147 To avoid such automatic responses as downshifting, but instead employ
the best of one=s analytical and problem solving skills, including an objective evaluation of one=s
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own resources, as well as their limitations, and then seek out other resources necessary create an
effective solution requires motivation, competence and confidence.148

3. IMPLICATIONS FOR TEACHING PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN LAW
SCHOOL.
As we have seen, most of our moral choices are initiated automatically, before our cognitive
processes can be engaged, by values, social intuitions, expectations, and needs which we
developed over many years of daily living and implicit, emotionally rich learning. They are in
place before students arrive at law school. Moreover, the more stress we experience when
confronted by a moral or ethical dilemma, the more likely we are to simply rely on those
emotional memories, and the less likely we are to engage our cognitive resources. The lawyers in
the problems at the beginning of this paper probably studied the rules of professional
responsibility, yet they were unable to overcome the pressures of the situations in which they
found themselves, even to the point of considering the ethical issues, and developing an
appropriate problem solving strategy. Nevertheless, while our mental-emotional edifice,
constructed over many years, is powerful, our pre-adult experiences are not necessarily our
destiny.149 But it is not easy to change. Simply studying and learning moral reasoning won=t do
it.
After childhood, Aemotional learning doesn=t stop, but it slows. Y [O]ften the only emotional
learning one sees after childhood is the reinforcement of existing fundamentals.@150 They
suggest that three to five years, sometimes more of therapy is usually required to make
significant change in adults= emotional responses.151 Haidt suggests A[y]ears of. . . .implicit
learning, coupled with explicit discussion, should gradually tune up intuitions. . . about justice,
rights, and fairness, leading perhaps to an automatic tendency to look at problems from multiple
perspectives. ...@152 But he ventures no guess as to how long that might take.
The legal education described by Friedland=s survey results153 and familiar to all of us does not
seem likely to serve those goals. Worse yet, it may, as I think the examples at the beginning of
this article demonstrate, be antithetical to them.
For most law students, their exposure to matters of professional responsibility is limited to taking
one course in the subject, and in preparing for and taking the Multi State Professional
Responsibility Examination (MPRE).154 Although the American Bar Association has, since
148
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1974, required as a condition of accreditation that a law school require each of its graduates to
complete a course in professional responsibility,155 there is little incentive for students to really
Adig into@ the subject, even at the rule based level. 156
To the extent that the course is taught in a manner similar to that used in other subject matter
courses, the emotional experience of the students is minimal.157 Certainly, there is always some
emotional connection when one is called upon in class, and with final exams. Yet, in class, and
when the exam is comprised of the standard essay and/or multiple choice questions, the student
is required to identify and apply the rule of professional conduct implicated in a given fact
pattern. The emotional connection is with knowing and applying the correct rule in a situation in
which the student knows, in advance, that the fact pattern raises one or more ethical questions.
Student’s emotional engagement is not with seeking to discover and understand the full context,
identifying and creating options, discerning the ethical choice, and acting on it by exercising
judgment to decide what to do, and communicating that judgment to a client and/or supervisor
who might prefer a different response, knowing that she may face adverse consequences from
her choices. Rather, the only thing at risk is the student=s grade in a course she may see as
having little impact on her future.
Legal problems encountered throughout the law school curriculum, outside of Professional
Responsibility class, are generally taken from the instrumentalist perspective, and do not
consider maters of professional responsibility, i.e., they ask only how to do something. Matters
of professional responsibility are, inherently, normative, i.e., asking whether to do something.
Thus, to the extent that our students carry memories of issues relevant to ethical decision
making, they are primarily explicitly learned, Ataxon@ memories of specific rules learned in their
one class on ethics and professional responsibility.158
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If we return to consider the problems which introduced this paper in light of what cognitive
science teaches us about learning and acting we will see that they have several things in
common:
1. Each of them was perceived as carrying significant risk to the lawyer.
2. In each case the lawyer had neither practice addressing such challenging
problems, nor had they an apparently readily available source of support for analyzing or
addressing the problem.
3. Each lawyer Adownshifted.@ (a)They acted as if there was no ethical issue to
consider, despite their knowledge of the rules. Denial and avoidance are clear examples of
Aflight.@ and (b) The problem solving behavior they chose to employ is perfectly explainable in
terms of the Athree principles@ that were imbedded in their implicit memory in law school. They
acted automatically, reverting to the tried and true.159
If it is true that our reactions in the face of moral or ethical questions are most significantly
automatic, driven by social intuitions, which are primarily governed by elaborately encoded,
implied emotional memories, 160 and if the legal academy is concerned about our students=
performance as ethical lawyers, then law school are faced with a dilemma. On one hand, if
students come to us with intuitions that incline them to be reflective and responsible about moral
and ethical issues, to look at problems from multiple perspectives, to search, and then act
consistently with the morally correct decision,161 we want to reinforce them, and also give them
the tools to enable them to be both professionally responsible, and zealous and effective
advocates for their clients. On the other hand, if they come to the law school with intuitions that
do not incline them to consider issues of ethics and professional responsibility, other than
perhaps as traps to avoid, rather than reinforcing those intuitions their legal education should
seek to enhance their sensitivity and responsiveness to the important role that those issues play in
our profession, while assuring them that to do so is not to surrender their effectiveness as
advocates for their clients. Law schools should help them acquire the skills to pursue both goals
simultaneously, and the emotional strength to do so. That is, we should strive to create new
explicit and implicit emotional memory of being ethically responsible, while exercising the skills
necessary to effective problem solving as advocates for their clients.
school, a single exposure to professional responsibility in a two or three credit mandatory, upper level course, often
taught after the students have passed the MPRE, challenges even the very best of teachers to really engage the
students at an emotional level. C.f., Frenkel, supra note 25, at 20-23 (arguing that although professional
responsibility is the only required subject in all law schools, it is difficult to teach because there is not a uniform
format, duration or teaching method, there is not always institutional support in the form of resources and credit
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responsibility to the course in AProfessional Responsibility,@ we run the risk of limiting our students= ability to apply
the principles and practices we teach in that course to other contexts. See e.g., HOW PEOPLE LEARN, supra note 134,
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Motivation is the key to attitude change. Attitude change is driven by the need to affirm oneself
as a good person. Self affirmation can be achieved by changing one=s attitude about one=s
behavior - either changing the behavior so that it comports with prior values, or changing one=s
values as they relate to the extant behaviors.162
As long as law schools teach students to value effective legal arguments without regard to the
moral and ethical consequences of their actions, they will not motivated to value embedding
ethical and moral considerations in their professional behavior as lawyers.

III. BUILDING BETTER LAWYERS THROUGH CONTEXTUALLY RICH, EMOTIONALLY
163
ENGAGED LEARNING

A. WHAT WOULD IT TAKE?
In order to make the best use of their analytical abilities in the face of ethically opaque situations,
students also need to be motivated to do so, and to understand the historically developed
Aintuitions@ that are pushing or pulling them in particular directions. They need to have the skills
and confidence to engage in the type of analysis that encompasses both values and traditional
legal analysis, and the courage to make professionally responsible choices in the face of
conflicting values. And they should learn how to seek and obtain support when they need to
work through problems freighted with ethical issues, as most practitioners do.
To achieve those results, law faculty will need to construct a learning environment specifically
designed for that purpose.
B. WHAT WOULD EMOTIONALLY ENGAGED LEARNING in LAW SCHOOL LOOK
LIKE?
1. Moral Diversity, Open Discussion, and Reflective Lawyering in a Law School Class.
Beyond the mastery of traditional lawyering skills, our students need to learn, to paraphrase
Carrie Menkel- Meadow, to pose such questions, as:
AWhat are these parties trying to accomplish? [I.e.,What are their real goals, needs, interests, and
priorities?]? What are the likely/possible needs or interests of other parties who may be involved
in the case, or in important, ongoing or potential, relationships with one or more of the parties?Y.
162
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What is really at stake? Y. What are the legal, social, economic, political, psychological, moral,
or ethical risks and benefits of litigation? Of non-litigated outcomes? What other considerations
might the client be willing to entertain, if they were brought to awareness? Are there ways to
satisfy our client=s needs as well as all, or some, of the needs of others? What other arrangements
might be better to deal with this problem? Why might they be better or worse?@164
They also need to ask themselves,
AAre there motivations or expectations that I have that are driving me toward, or away from,
recommending, or even considering, particular strategies or tactics? Are their individual values
or relationships, including, but not limited to those of my client, that might be impacted
differently by our selection of strategy or tactics?@
Beyond their mastery of formal analytical, and argumentative skills, students should be able to
consider the values, or social intuitions that underlie the choices they make, especially with
respect to issues of professional responsibility, and consider perspectives other than their own, or
that of the instrumentalist view of lawyering.165 They need to be motivated to seek a morally and
ethically appropriate solution, not merely to construct a plausible argument that leads to a predetermined result. They need to have confidence that they can act in a morally appropriate way,
in order to avoid downshifting in the face of morally challenging situations.
To achieve such goals, our students must become comfortable dealing with what Jonathan Haidt,
Evan Rosenberg, and Holly Hamm have referred to as Amoral diversity.@166 However, as Haidt,
Rosenberg and Homm point out, there is a substantial body of social psychological research that
indicates that moral diversity in a group makes it difficult for members to work together, because
differences based upon Aculture and world view@ lead to Adesires for ostracism and
punishment.@167 Their own studies of University of Virginia undergraduates confirm that moral
diversity reduces desires for interaction more than does demographic diversity. 168
At the same time, however, Aparticipants [in their study] saw a special value in diversity in
educational contexts.... [They] seemed to be saying that exposure to [moral] differences in the
controlled and safe setting of a class room was desirable.@169 The fact that students in the Haidt,
Rosenberg, and Homm study seemed to appreciate the value, and have less fear, of moral
diversity in an academic setting suggests that just such a venue, or perhaps a law school class
room, might well be appropriate for the introduction, open discussion, and reflection upon
morally diverse values.
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Yet, practice does not necessarily make perfect. Rather, it makes for more of the same, more
automatically. If we want students to consider with open minds the positive weight of the moral
values of others that differ from their own, and to appreciate the implications to others, as well as
the effectiveness for their clients, of various behaviors, only feedback, discussion, reflection, and
follow-up, led by someone skilled at evaluating their work, and communicating about it with
them non-judgmentally, are likely to produce that result.170 And they need the opportunity to
reflect, reconsider, and try again.171 Feedback and reflection also teaches flexibility,
transferability of knowledge, and that learning is built upon prior learning.172 Feedback and
reflection thus build metacognition, the ability to understand one=s own cognitive processes.173
2. Let Them In On The Secret.
For more than 10 years, I have been teaching in a law school clinical program in which the
students represent real clients. I also supervise externs, students whose clinical experience is with
a legal organization outside of the law school, where all of their case supervision is by the
organization=s lawyers. In our clinic my clinical faculty colleagues and I supervise students
representing clients of our law school-based Ateaching law office.@ In the clinic seminar, we
include a class explicitly designed to introduce our students to the idea that they come to their
work with a broad array of values, assumptions, judgments, expectations, emotional needs, etc.
With our externs we use the requirement that they maintain journals, which we read, and meet
with us on a regular basis to introduce them to the importance of their own values and needs in
assessing their sensory experiences, analyzing situations, and making judgments. We try to
demonstrate that their values and emotional needs are based upon a lifetime of experience, their
particular lifetime of experience, but not that of others - even others as similar to themselves as
their classmates, let alone as different from themselves as their clients. These issues include, of
course ethnic, gender, religious, and class stereotypes, but also a hierarchy of values covering a
myriad of topics. We discuss, explicitly, theories about how these Asocial intuitions@ influence
what they see and hear, and how they interact with others, and make judgments, and ask them to
consider these issues as they go about the work of representing their clients. And we urge them,
too, not to be critical of themselves as they work to become aware of what forces are influencing
their decision making. Throughout the semester in class and in supervision meetings we try to
raise questions to help them see where and why their internal self is influencing their analytical
and interpersonal work. Our semester is only 14 weeks long, but however skeptical and resistant
the student may be when we introduce the topic, most are convinced by the end of the semester
170
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that they are not the Aanalytical machine@ that they had previously supposed. And, I have had
many experiences of students by the end of the term who were able to articulate some of the
subtle forces operating within themselves as they struggled with their clients= problems.
By helping our students to understand these principles, and working with them to help them
experience those forces in action in the safe environment of our classes and clinical work, we
increase their ability to understand and control their impact.

3. Two Models of Instruction.
A. ALive Client@@ clinics
Law school clinics in which students represent real, clients offer a unique opportunity to learn
how to figure out what really is the problem, to uncover what really is at stake, what unidentified
relationships may be critical to one or another of the parties as they work towards a solution of
the problem, etc. Student lawyers must examine and understand the problem as presented by the
client, theorize as to potential solutions, plan and carry out legal research and factual
investigation, remain open to ongoing re-examination of the critical issues, identify limits in their
own knowledge and overcome those limits, integrate knowledge from other disciplines or
domains, learn, build on their prior learning, exercise judgment, make choices and experience
their consequences. Moreover, as Eleanor W. Myers has noted in assessing her simulation-based
course, AExperience exerts a powerful influence over the exercise of discretion. Experiential
learning is critical to moral development.@174 A[I]t is not until students actually experience the
reality of practice that they begin to internalize and make their own moral and ethical judgments
that are at the core of practice.@175 Clinics, in which the students represent clients in real matters
under the close supervision of experienced lawyers/teachers, thus provide a quintessential locale
for emotional engagement of law students in factually complex matters, challenging them to
identify and grapple with issues of professional responsibility. They also provide the opportunity
for frequent feedback and occasional modeling from experts. In such an atmosphere implicit,
emotional learning is likely to take place.
At the same time, because they are Alive,@ every case is different and quite unpredictable at the
outset. Given such unpredictability, it would be difficult to plan a problem solving or
professional responsibility curricular thread solely around live client clinics.
B. Problem-Based Learning
Between live client clinics and Langdellian reliance on appellate opinions there is a pedagogy, or
pedagogies, that will enable law students to engage in contextually rich, emotionally engaging,
experiential learning. Problem-Based Learning (P-BL)176 is one approach that gives us guidance
on how to satisfy those needs.
174
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PB-L is based upon the principle that by engaging students= interest and having them actively
engaged in the learning process, the students will learn how they learn, as well as learning the
concepts with which they are working to produce both more effective, usable knowledge and
long term Alearning capability.@177 Using P-BL, students develop an understanding of the facts
and circumstances in which the problem is situated, define, or re-define, the problem(s) or
goal(s), consider whatever competing interests may be involved, prioritize, identify the nature
and sources of the information needed to achieve the goal, obtain that information, employ
critical thinking, exercise judgment, reconsider earlier conclusions or assumptions, make and
defend their decisions, reflect on their own learning process and results, and work with the
situation as it evolves over time.178 Essential to the process is the participation of a mentor, who
can assist the learners to remain on task, collaborate, and encourage reflection on their work as
they proceed.179 For the reasons discussed below, P-BL can be expected to produce more
elaborately encoded patterns of neural connections of the approach to problem solving
demonstrated by professionals with adaptive expertise, as well as the ability to examine problems
from multiple perspectives, which is essential to professionally responsible conduct.
(i). Motivating Students
Motivation stimulates attention and learning.180 Motivation can be externally generated by the
expectation of rewards or punishments (i.e., grades).181 However, learning tends to be more
powerful when its motivation is internally generated by the learner=s belief in the usefulness of
the learning.182 A belief that what one is doing has real value to oneself or others is a powerful
motivator.183 Most students come to law school wanting to become lawyers. Thus, the more that
J. Duch et al. eds., 2001) (outlining useful strategies for how educators can introduce problem-based learning into
their courses).
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students feel that the problems they confront in law school actually relate to the real world of
lawyering, the greater their internal motivation to engage with them, and the greater their
learning from that experience.184
(ii). Teaching Students to be Adaptive Problem Solvers
Langdellian, case-method, teaching provides the students with all of the information they need,
from the statement of the problem to the facts and legal authorities available for its solution. But
lawyers seldom have such luxury. Frequently, they help to clarify the question, investigate the
facts, recognize that over time everything, even the client=s goals and priorities, may change,
find, or create, the legal principles that best support the client, and then marshal the evidence that
best supports the application of those principles. P-BL, by providing limited information at the
outset of the problem calls on the students to engage in similar activities to those of the lawyer.
Students thus learn to exercise judgment to identify and obtain necessary information to consider
the implications of change over time, both factually and legally, as well as relationships that
might continue beyond the solution of the presenting problem, to understand their own thought
processes, recognize the limits of their own knowledge, and to identify and secure resources
appropriate to the solution of the problem (Metacognition).
(iv). Collaboration
Most lawyers work collaboratively in addressing clients= problems. Collaboration is an
immeasurably valuable tool in addressing ethical problems. In most law school course work,
however, collaboration is a violation of the honor code. Moreover, law schools provide no
support for creating, effectively using, or evaluating collaborations. The students learn about
group process and collaboration as a skill only by chance.
P-BL advocates consistently urge that students be required to work in teams for several reasons.
First, it brings together the collective skills of the team members,185 demonstrating the
appropriateness and value of collaboration to work and scholarship.186 Collaboration reduces the
individual student=s sense of isolation, which tends to improve performance.187 Less isolation
may produce less fear, and thus less Adownshifting.@188 Students are likely to be motivated to be
able to contribute to the team=s goals, thereby increasing their emotional engagement with the
problem.189 Collaboration requires them to make decisions and to communicate effectively to
their teammates the evidence and reasons supporting those decisions.190 It thereby improves
184
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both reasoning and communication skills.191 The process of working in teams also generates
appreciation for differences in learning and communication styles, increasing social maturity.192
Collaboration can significantly increase one=s exposure to other perspectives, and values.
However, as anyone who has read Lord of the Flies,193 or observed a group of unsupervised
children at play, knows, group work can get messy and counterproductive194, not to mention
emotionally harmful. To avoid those pitfalls, and keep the group on task, and really
collaborating B as opposed to competing or engaging in Aparallel play@ - a group facilitator is
required.195 In their course, Eleanor W. Myers and Nancy Knauer, used practitioners who, as
adjunct faculty, met periodically with the students in small groups.196 In Law and Lawyering in
the Workplace,197 Professor Sturm and I were able to perform that role assisted by one teaching
assistant because we controlled the class size. In my law school=s first year legal writing course,
carefully selected and trained third year students, under the supervision of the faculty head of the
program are the facilitators. In live client clinics, the clinical supervisors perform this function
for the teams of students they supervise.
(iv). Teaching Our Students to Avoid Downshifting
Downshifting occurs when the situation creates too high a level of stress, for example, when it
appears to the individual to pose an insoluble problem, and the risk of error is too great. If law
students are placed in realistic, though simulated, situations involving ethical dilemmas
comparable to those faced by lawyers, supported in their efforts to solve the problem, given the
opportunity to reflect on their work, individually, among their peers, and with supervision so that
they can see what worked, what did not, and why, and what other options might have been
considered, actively encouraged to consider multiple perspectives and the ethical dimensions
throughout the process, and called on to repeat that process at various points throughout law
school, the implicit messages will be (1) that seeking and applying ethically correct answers is
important for lawyers; (2) these problems are soluble, and (3) that they are competent to solve
them. They will have felt the intellectual, emotional, and moral challenge of the problem. Likely,
they will have experienced trial and error, without dire consequences, but rather the opportunity
for reflective consideration of their process and others that they might have pursued. They will
be supported to value identifying and working towards an ethical solution to ethical problems,
rather than merely making an argument to achieve predetermined outcomes. They will
understand the relevant concepts, in the contexts in which they arise, and have a bank of
experience to call on in addressing moral and ethical problems when they arise in Areal life.@
Given such experience and knowledge, as lawyers they should be less likely to respond
automatically, or to downshift, and more likely to engage their sophisticated cognitive powers
when such dilemmas arise in the future.
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(v). Adapting Problem-Based Learning to Law School
Adapting P-BL to legal education should not be difficult.198 For example, Professors Eleanor W.
Myers and Nancy Knauer teach an AIntegrated Transactional Practice Course@ (ITP), in which
they combine the teaching of Trusts and Estates and Professional Responsibility using Alongterm, live simulations@199 The course was designed starting with the desired progression of the
trusts and estates issues, then building in professional responsibility problems in a sequence that
Myers says Adeveloped naturally.@200 They use six client files, which they have attempted to
make realistic. In so doing, they have created the underlying Astories@ of Athe parties, their
lawyers, their decisions and choices, and provide a full description of the factual context in
which the matter arose.@201 The students grapple with the problems in the Afirst person,@
experiencing the challenges, and the emotion of exercising discretion and judgment, and
assuming personal responsibility.202 Throughout the course, the faculty is available as Amentors@
to facilitate discussion of substantive, strategic and ethical issues.203
For many years, New York University Law School has had a first year course, AThe Lawyering
Program,@ in which small groups of students, frequently sub-divided into smaller teams,
addresses a series of problems typical of problems faced by lawyers in daily practice. Teaching
both legal Aanalysis@ and lawyering Askills@ are goals of the course. Imbedded in certain of the
problems, e.g., counseling and negotiating, are ethical issues. There is detailed faculty feedback
after each exercise.204
A less ambitious example was ALaw and Lawyering In The Work Place,@205 in which Susan
Sturm and I, using employment discrimination law as our subject matter, created a series of
problems for each segment of the course. Each problem required the application of the doctrinal
principles covered in the current course segment and built upon the work done earlier in the
198
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semester. For each, the students were required to act Ain role@ and to employ different skills that
lawyers regularly use in representing their clients. A number of the problems required the
students to work collaboratively. After each role play, we provided feedback to the individual
students as well as to the class as a whole. Frequently, lawyers, or other experts (e.g., police
officials, statisticians, women=s= rights advocates, etc.), participated in the problems, and also
provided feedback.
The National Institute for Trial Advocacy (NITA) has been teaching trial skills to lawyers and
law students for 30 years, using both individual problems (i.e., short, fact statements focused on
a particular skill), and entire mock Acase files@ that call upon the Astudents@ to read the factual
material, decide on the legal and factual theories they will pursue, marshal the evidence and legal
arguments they need, anticipate their adversaries theories and arguments and prepare to meet
them, prepare their witnesses, decide upon and obtain trial exhibits, and then perform the trial
under the scrutiny of experts, who provide feedback. From the experience of the NITA model, a
number of law schools have developed integrated courses which teach evidence, trial advocacy
and professional responsibility.206
Examples of courses which integrate problem solving with professional responsibility are also
available.207 The Center For Professionalism at The University of Pennsylvania Law School
produced videos of a number of factually complex Astories@ in which professional responsibility
issues were imbedded. These videos were widely used to educate law students, lawyers, and
judges. Their model was to present a segment of a Astory,@ stop, have the audience, guided by a
trained presenter, discuss the facts, and identify and address whatever ethical issues they spotted,
and before moving on to the next segment in which the story continued. Each segment included
actual ethical problems and/or conduct that might well lead to such problems if followed.208
David Luban and Michael Millman, have developed a live client clinical course which
consciously incorporates professional responsibility as a for-credit element of the course.209
In his Professional Responsibility course, Douglas Frenkel consciously seeks to create an
environment in which his students Acan experience a situation on both intellectual and emotional
planes. Y[By placing them] in unresolved situations that are complex in terms of variables
internal[ly] and external[ly] . . . with current facts unclear, future consequences undefined, and
resolution susceptible to several choices@210 He uses problems taken from real cases, places
students in role, and encourages collaboration among the students.211 At the conclusion of each
problem he leads discussion and reflection among the class members.212
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C. WHEN AND WHERE TO ENGAGE THE STUDENTS
1. Start in the First Year
The University of California at Berkeley=s Boalt Hall Law School experimented with a three year
program introducing legal ethics in the first year curriculum and then discarded the idea, opting
to move the course to the second year, in large measure because of a combination of student and
faculty opposition. 213 Students regarded the two credit course as less important than their other
course work, described the Astudy of legal ethics as Apatronizing, preachy, irrelevant, or
intellectually soft,@ 214 and evaluated the instructors= performance significantly below that of their
other teachers.215 For their part, faculty felt that by including the course in the first year, students
suffered because they lacked Aexposure to relevant advanced courses@ and had little, if any,
practice experience.216 Other schools have also tried, and rejected, the idea. Nevertheless, I
submit that there are useful reasons for introducing professional responsibility into the first year
curriculum.
First, assuming that we are fighting a battle to overcome, or reinforce in the face of negative
learning in law school, students= social intuitions, the sooner we get started the better. Three
years offers more opportunity than two.
Second, students arrive at law school excited to be initiated into the world of law and lawyering.
They are emotionally prepared to accept that learning from their first year courses and
professors. What we omit, as what we include in the first year curriculum, sends an implicit, but
readily learned, message about what we think B no, what we Aknow@ B is important for lawyers to
do, and therefore for law students to learn. Consequently, Ait is what is imprinted in that initial
immersion and not any broader messages of the three years, that shapes the students=
consciousness of what is important and not important to being a lawyer.@217 Again, if it is their
intuitions, developed over many years, that we are trying to overcome or reinforce in connection
with their roles as lawyers, we can expect them to be more open to that in the first year before
they become jaded. My experience with the Law & Lawyering In The Workplace218 course
convinced me that by the end of one semester of law school, we have effectively inculcated in
our students the Athree principles@ of legal problem solving. Thereafter, it is difficult to get them
to Aunlearn@ that process or to supplement it with broader considerations that are necessary for
the problem solving necessary in representing clients in the practice of law.
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Surely the first year curriculum is important and crowded. Yet, I know of no evidence that
teaching first year students to engage in creative problem solving would interfere with their
learning traditional legal analysis. I also know of no evidence that a first semester, or first year,
of law school which devoted less than 100% of course time to teaching only the traditional
approach to legal problem solving would, in any manner or degree, impair law students=
analytical abilities, or other functioning as lawyers. Hence, I must conclude that teaching broad
based problem solving techniques in the first year would be a valuable addition to the legal
education of our students.
Problems of design for the inclusion of professional responsibility in the first year curriculum
can be overcome. Deborah Rhode,219 Carrie Menkel-Meadow,220 and others have developed such
materials. Moreover, faculty who teach in the first year curriculum are certainly capable of
learning to use such materials in order to make their inclusion meaningful, and effective.221
2. Teach Pervasively
Deborah Rhode argues that law students can best understand by having ethical issues arise in all
of their courses.222 Her position is supported by the recent research on memory, discussed above
in Part II. Moreover, as we have seen, understanding, and learning to apply the transferability of
learning requires that we teach it in multiple contexts.223 Professional responsibility problems
arise in every type of practice, in every subject matter, and perhaps every day, for lawyers. If we
want law students to be prepared to recognize and address ethical issues as part of their every
day practice of law those problems should present themselves as part of their Aevery day@ legal
education in order that elaborately encoded implicit memory for those experiences is created. If
students encountered ethical issues in five different courses, they would have the opportunity of
recognizing them in five different contexts. Engaging with ethical issues under the tutelage of
five different professors= is also likely to produce a much richer learning experience than doing
so with only one.

IV. CONCLUSION

AA rational approach to curriculum design would begin with an assessment of the law school=s
mission and of the kind of student we wish to train and would then attempt to divine an
appropriate blend and sequence law, institutions, skills, perspectives and professional issues.@224
For many years, the legal profession has recognized that the kind of lawyers that clients, the
profession and the community needs, are those who can carry out their professional
responsibilities as representatives of their clients, officers of the judicial system, and public
citizens exercising moral and ethical judgment of the highest order.225 Unfortunately, most law
219
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schools have either not accepted as a significant part of their mission the role of training law
students for that practice mode, or otherwise ignored Professor Gorman=s admonition.226
Consequently, prevalent law school curriculum and pedagogy are not well suited to producing
lawyers well equipped for either role. Seeing this, many law professors have experimented with
course design and delivery seeking to impart these traits and practices to their students. Recent
discoveries in cognitive psychology and neuroscience demonstrate rather clearly that a pedagogy
based upon contextually rich, emotionally engaging, role based, problem solving, coupled with
ongoing reflective discourse is most likely to significantly enhance law students= effective
engagement with, and mastery of, the role of ethical practitioner. It is now up to us to engage that
learning in our teaching.
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